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Criminal Law
JOSEPH W. HATCHETT* AND BRIAN E. NORTON**
The authors focus on the past two years of Florida appellate
decisions on criminal law. The areas discussed include illegal
searches and seizures, confessions, disclosure of confidential in-
formants, the speedy trial rule, immunity, contempt, pleas of
guilty and nolo contendere, improper inquiry and argument, jury
instructions and sentencing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys approximately two and a half years of Flor-
ida appellate decisions in substantive and procedural criminal law.'
The focus, however, has been narrowed to encompass approximately
a dozen areas.' These include some of the major trends developing
in criminal law and procedure, as well as some well established
errors which unfortunately continue to arise in Florida trial courts.
A few of the topics discussed herein are as yet unresolved. 3 It is
hoped that the discussions of the underlying principles and reasons
behind these developments will be helpful to trial judges and attor-
neys attempting to apply these principles to particular fact situa-
tions.
II. ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
A. Procedure
In a pretrial hearing challenging the validity of a warrantless
search, the initial burden is upon the defendant, as the moving
party, to show that the search was invalid.' That burden can be met
by a motion asserting the absence of a warrant and the trial court
judicially noticing that its own file in the case contains no such
warrant.' The burden then shifts to the state to sustain the ultimate
burden as to the validity of the search. In its order granting or
denying a motion to suppress, a trial court should recite its findings
1. Volumes 310 through 350 Southern Reporter 2d.
2. There have been other important decisions in criminal law during the survey period,
such as: Dumas v. State, 350 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1977)(procedural rules regarding sequestration
of witnesses construed); State v. Simpson, 347 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1977) (unlawful assembly
statute narrowly construed to survive overbreadth attack); State v. Winters, 346 So. 2d 991
(Fla. 1977); and State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1977) (statutes held unconstitu-
tionally vague); Belote v. State, 344 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1977) (procedural rule regarding the
consolidation of cases construed); State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1976); and Spears
v. State, 337 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976) (statutes held unconstitutionally overbroad). However,
most of the decisions excluded from this article are readily ascertainable through annotated
versions of the statutes and rules.
3. Justice Hatchett notes that he does not wish to indicate prejudgments as to the correct
disposition of any particular cases prior to their proper presentation on appeal. This article
is a review and analysis of legal principles.
4. State v. Lyons, 293 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
5. State v. Hinton, 305 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
6. Mann v. State, 292 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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of fact and conclusions of law.'
In Elson v. State,' the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the
argument that a defendant had no standing to challenge the validity
of a search merely because he had no right of occupancy or owner-
ship in the premises subject to the search. The District Court of
Appeal, First District, had held that the defendant did not have
standing to question the validity of the search since he was not
registered in the motel and, therefore, there was no constitutional
inhibition against a search of the motel room.9 The supreme court
rejected this argument and noted that although the motel room was
registered to another person, the defendant possessed a key, and the
room contained the defendant's property. Recognizing that federal
courts since Jones v. United States'" have disregarded the technical
distinctions relating to traditional rights of occupancy and posses-
sion, the Supreme Court of Florida held that in this context, the
question of standing depended entirely on the defendant's right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This is consistent
with the view that the fourth amendment protects a citizen's rea-
sonable expectations of privacy.
B. Abandoned Property
Some seizures by the state do not involve a search within the
contemplation of the fourth amendment. A police officer may pro-
perly seize any contraband in plain view if it is observed by the
officer from a place where he has a legal right to be." Florida courts
have also held that there is no search involved when the police seize
contraband which has been voluntarily abandoned." In State v.
Nittolo, ,3 a police officer following a vehicle suspected of containing
illegal narcotics observed the driver commit a minor traffic infrac-
tion. The officer turned on his flashing light in an attempt to stop
the suspects. At this point, the officer observed something being
thrown from the car. Upon retrieving the article, it was found to be
a bag of marijuana. The trial court suppressed this evidence on the
grounds that it was illegally obtained during a pretextual traffic
stop. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that the offi-
7. State v. Thomas, 332 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); State v. Hysell, 281 So. 2d 417
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
8. 337 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1976).
9. Id. at 961. The opinion of the District Court of Appeal, First District, is reported at
310 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
10. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
11. State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
12. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 240 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
13. 317 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1975).
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cer's conduct prior to stopping the defendants' vehicle was neither
illegal nor improper, and that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
was therefore inapplicable. The contraband was voluntarily aban-
doned by the defendants, and the police officer was where he had a
right to be, doing what he was trained to do. The mere fact that the
defendants panicked and discarded what was later discovered to be
contraband, did not give rise to an after the fact contention that the
officer was going to stop the vehicle "as a pretext for a warrantless
search.""
C. Illegal Stops
Although a police officer may stop the driver of an automobile
for questioning when he has less than probable cause, 5 it is well
recognized that the police may not do so arbitrarily or on a bare
suspicion that the occupants are violating the law. In Coladonato
v. State, 11a police officer observed a U-Haul van being driven in the
city's business district during the early evening hours. He stopped
the van because it was an unusual vehicle to be in the area at that
time of night. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer observed
boxes of stereo equipment in the rear of the van. The defendant's
identity was checked through the police station computers, which
revealed that he was wanted on an arrest warrant in another state.
A check of local stereo stores led to the discovery that the equipment
in the van had been stolen in a recent burglary. The Supreme Court
of Florida held that the trial court should have granted the defen-
dant's motion to suppress this illegally seized evidence because the
initial stop was not based upon any articulable facts justifying the
officer's suspicion that illegal activity had been or was about to be
committed. 7
D. Inventory Searches
Florida courts have also upheld the validity of routine inventory
searches of vehicles. A distinction, however, has developed between
a valid inventory search and an invalid exploratory search in which
the inventory is used merely as a pretext for a general search. In
State v. Jenkins,1 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
14. Id. at 750. See State v. Nittolo, 303 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (Mager, J.,
dissenting). See also Smith v. State, 333 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
15. Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22, 26 (Fla. 1975).
16. 348 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1977).
17. Id. at 327. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Porshay
v. State, 321 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
18. 319 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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discussed at length the inventory search doctrine as an exception to
the constitutional rule prohibiting warrantless searches. Although
an inventory is considered a search within the prohibition of the
fourth amendment, it will be held reasonable if the totality of the
circumstances demonstrate that the search was a bona fide inven-
tory made in the ordinary course of police procedures. The court
noted that the impoundment of an automobile and its concomitant
inventory search is of questionable validity when the location of the
automobile does not create a traffic hazard or nuisance, and the
owner or operator chooses not to have his car impounded. An indi-
vidual who has been taken into custody should not have his vehicle
impounded, inventoried and towed away when alternative steps can
be taken to secure the vehicle, especially when the individual is
willing to accept responsibility for the safe keeping of the contents
of the vehicle.'9
The principles set forth in Jenkins were approved by the Su-
preme Court of Florida in Elson v. State." In that case, police en-
tered a motel room for the alleged purpose of making an inventory
search of its contents to protect any property belonging to the pre-
viously arrested defendant. The court reiterated that "the inventory
search concept can validate a warrantless search only when the
police have some valid reason or right for taking a defendant's prop-
erty into custody."'2 In Elson, the court rejected the state's argu-
ment that the police reasonably made an inventory of the property
of the defendant to protect it while he was in jail. The motel owner,
rather than the police, had a duty to protect the defendant's prop-
erty in the motel room. The court stated that the defendant should
have been given the choice of leaving his belongings in the motel
room or requesting the sheriff to take them into custody for him. He
should not have been required to have his personal belongings stored
by the sheriff during the time he was in jail.
E. Consent Searches
The Supreme Court of Florida has resolved several important
questions concerning the application of the consent exception to the
constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches. In Bailey v.
State,12 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a
19. "The individual in custody should be advised of and given the choice of leaving the
car in its location, contacting someone else to take charge of the car or having it impounded."
Id. at 94.
20. 337 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1976).
21. Id. at 962.
22. 295 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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seizure of drugs was permissible due to the defendant's prior consent
to the search which revealed the drugs. The supreme court reversed
the decision of the district court.23 A police officer had stopped the
automobile in which the defendant was a passenger to determine
the reason for its unusual operation. The car had been proceeding
on the Florida Turnpike at a speed of only forty-five miles per hour
and was weaving slightly. The court held that this initial stop was
made for the purpose of investigating suspicious activity and was
therefore valid. The investigation should have ceased, however,
once the officer found that the driver was not under the influence
of alcohol and that he possessed a valid driver's license and proof
of the vehicle's ownership. In Bailey, the officer continued his inves-
tigation and subsequently seized a plastic sandwich bag which ap-
peared to contain marijuana ashes. The occupants were then placed
under arrest and the officer sought permission to search a cosmetic
bag in the possession of one of the passengers. There was conflicting
evidence as to whether such permission was given. The subsequent
search revealed the drugs which became the object of the motion to
suppress. The trial court denied this motion, and the district court
affirmed the denial on the ground that an appellate court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. The supreme
court disagreed with this standard of appellate review, stating that
following an illegal arrest, valid consent to search should be upheld
only if the circumstances are so strong, clear and convincing as to
remove any doubt that the waiver was truly voluntary.2' The su-
preme court reversed the trial court's determination because there
was a lack of clear and convincing proof that the defendant waived
his constitutional right.
The Supreme Court of Florida has also resolved a conflict
among the Florida appellate courts as to whether one person who
jointly occupies a premises with another person may validly consent
to a search and seizure of the other person's property over the objec-
tion of that person. In Silva v. State,25 the defendant occupied an
apartment with his girlfriend. Following an argument, the woman
called the police and told them that her boyfriend had hit her, that
he was a convicted felon and that he had guns in his closet. The
defendant boyfriend told the police officers not to search his closet.
The officers searched the closet, however, found the guns and ar-
rested the defendant. The court noted, "it has generally been held
that the husband and wife relationship, without more, does not
23. 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975).
24. Id. at 28.
25. 344 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1977).
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authorize one spouse to waive the constitutional rights of the other
by consenting to a warrantless search."" The supreme court rea-
soned that the validity of a search in such a situation should not
hinge on the marital status of the parties. Unless consent is given
by the owner or rightful possessor of the property, a warrant must
be obtained. The court noted that the test applicable to the fourth
amendment is whether or not the person's reasonable expectations
of privacy have been violated.Y
In Silva, the court cited with approval Padron v. State. " In that
case, the defendant was arrested following a shooting incident at his
home. The defendant admitted that the gun which he had used was
in his house but expressly told the investigating officers that they
did not have his permission to enter the house. At the time, the
house was occupied by the defendant's three sons. Initially, the
oldest son, sixteen years old, denied the police entry but consented
after he and his younger brothers were forced outside into the cold
night by the police. The district court held that the seizure was
invalid on two grounds: (1) the son did not have the authority to give
the consent after his father had refused to do so, and (2) the consent
was not voluntary.9
F. Probable Cause
If a search is based upon a valid impoundment and inventory
of a vehicle or upon the voluntary consent of the person whose
property is the subject of the search, then the state is not required
to show that it possessed probable cause to believe that contraband,
fruits of a crime or instrumentalities of a crime were present upon
the person, vehicle or premises searched. All other searches, except
those involving a stop and frisk of an individual for weapons" or a
limited search incident to a lawful arrest,3 must be based upon
probable cause. Probable cause exists where the facts and circum-
stances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves
to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense
has been or is being committed.32 In several recent decisions, the
courts have noted that proof of probable cause involves more than
a mere showing of suspicion on the part of the officer. In D'Agostino
26. Id. at 561.
27. Id. at 563 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
28. 328 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
29. Id. at 218.
30. FLA. STAT. § 901.151 (1977).
31. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
32. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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v. State,"3 the police arrested the defendant without a warrant, but
pursuant to a general "be on the lookout for" bulletin (BOLO). This
BOLO stated only that a burglary had just been committed by a
person with "bare legs, and white socks and shoes."3 The Supreme
Court of Florida held that this information was insufficient to pro-
vide probable cause, and that the arrest and search of the defendant
were invalid.
In Brown v. State,"3 the defendant was a passenger in a car
which had been stopped for speeding. While issuing a citation to the
driver, the police observed marijuana seeds in the automobile. The
passenger was searched and found to be in possession of marijuana.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the police
did not have probable cause for the warrantless search. The only
fact relevant to the probable cause issue within the officer's knowl-
edge at the time he conducted the search was that marijuana seeds
were present in the automobile in which the defendant was riding
as a passenger. Under these circumstances, a man of reasonable
caution would not be justified in believing that the defendant pos-
sessed the marijuana.
Similarly, in Williams v. State,"6 the police arrested the driver
of an automobile in which the defendant was a passenger. Subse-
quently, the police officer observed narcotics paraphernalia in the
automobile, and a packet of heroin was found in the possession of a
second passenger. An initial search of the defendant revealed noth-
ing, but the police arrested him and discovered the presence of drugs
during a more complete search at the police station. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the police possessed
insufficient information to establish probable cause to arrest the
defendant since there was nothing to connect him with the contra-
band found in the car.
In Britton v. State,37 police officers investigating reports of a
prowler noticed the odor of marijuana emanating from a house
trailer. The officers pushed their way through a door, observed mari-
juana inside and arrested all occupants. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth District, stated that it was improper to presume that
all occupants and guests in the private home were in control and in
constructive possession of the marijuana being smoked by one or
merely some of them. Although the police officers' sense of smell
33. 310 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1975).
34. Id. at 14.
35. 313 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
36. 338 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
37. 336 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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told them that marijuana was being consumed within the trailer,
they could not identify any particular occupant as committing a
violation of the law. Thus, there was not probable cause to arrest
the defendant, and the fruits of this arrest should have been sup-
pressed."
G. Exigent Circumstances
In the case of a warrantless search, once probable cause is es-
tablished, it is still incumbent upon the state to prove that some
exigent circumstance exists which obviates the need to obtain a
warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate. For example, in
Raffield v. State,3" the Supreme Court of Florida held that although
the police possessed sufficient probable cause prior to making a
warrantless search, no exigent circumstance existed, and that a war-
rant should have been obtained prior to conducting the search. The
court rejected arguments by the state that several exigent circum-
stances existed which made it imperative that an immediate war-
rantless search be undertaken. First, the state argued that since
other conspirators had been recently arrested, the defendant might
learn of these arrests and destroy the evidence. Additionally, the
search took place on Christmas Eve and the officers believed that
it would have been difficult to obtain a search warrant at that time.
The state admitted, however, that no effort had been made to ob-
tain a warrant. The court stated that the police officers should have
made prior arrangements for a judicial officer to be available for
warrant purposes. If such an attempt had been made and no judge
were available within a sufficient time, exigent circumstances might
have been deemed to exist.
These cases indicate that warrantless searches are generally
viewed with disfavor and that the police should obtain a warrant
whenever possible. The various exigent circumstances which ob-
viate the need for a warrant should be narrowly construed, and the
police must be prepared to prove such circumstances in order to
overcome the presumption that warrantless searches are invalid.
III. CONFESSIONS
A. Procedure
If a defendant properly moves to suppress an allegedly involun-
tary confession, the prosecution has the burden of proving by a
38. Id. at 665 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)).
39. 351 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1977). See also Hornblower v. State, 351 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1977).
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
preponderance of the evidence that the confession was freely and
voluntarily given.40 If a timely motion has been made, it is error for
the trial court to refuse to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to trial.
In McDonnell v. State,4' the defendant filed a motion to sup-
press a confession but, since there was no available time on the
judge's calendar, the motion was not heard prior to trial. When the
case was called for trial, the defendant again requested the court to
hear the motion. The judge refused on the ground that counsel
should have filed the motion at an earlier date so that it could have
been heard prior to trial. The statements were admitted into evi-
dence and the defendant was convicted. The district court held that
the trial court erred in refusing to hear the motion prior to trial, but
concluded from the totality of the evidence that the error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.42 The Supreme Court of Florida
stated that the district court had construed the harmless error doc-
trine in a way that would deny due process of law to the defendant 3
and remanded the case for a new trial. The trial court was instructed
to hold a separate hearing on the admissibility of the confession
prior to its admission at trial.
In Greene v. State," the Supreme Court of Florida resolved a
conflict regarding the necessity for a new trial when the trial court
fails to make an explicit ruling on the issue of the voluntariness of
a confession. The district court held that the trial court had erro-
neously refused to make an explicit finding of voluntariness, and
temporarily relinquished its jurisdiction and remanded the case to
the trial court to consider this issue. The supreme court, holding
that this was an insufficient remedy, stated: "A judge is not a com-
puter which can consistently make an objective determination as to
the admissiblity of a confession without the possibility that a prior
jury verdict of guilt may influence that ruling." 5 The defendant was
entitled to a new trial and an independent determination of admis-
sibility, to be held prior to the admission of the confession before
the jury.
B. Voluntariness
Prior to the admission into evidence of any statements made by
the defendant while in custody, the prosecution must show that the
40. McDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1973).
41. 336 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1976).
42. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
43. 336 So. 2d at 555 (citing Land v. State, 293 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1974)).
44. 351 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1977).
45. Id. at 942.
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defendant's waiver of any constitutional right, such as the right to
remain silent or the right to counsel, was made both knowingly and
intelligently." If a defendant indicates a desire to have an attorney
present during questioning, the police should discontinue their in-
terrogation until after the person has obtained and consulted coun-
sel.4"
Confessions, unlike guilty pleas, cannot be bargained for by the
prosecution." During an interrogation, it is improper for law en-
forcement officials to make direct or implied promises to a defen-
dant in exchange for his confession. It is well settled that a confes-
sion should be entirely free from the influence of hope or fear." In
Jarriel v. State,50 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held
that the police improperly told the defendant that his wife would
be arrested unless he made a confession. In Burch v. State,51 how-
ever, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the action of the police
in falsely telling the defendant that he had failed a polygraph test
was insufficient coercion to require suppression of a confession.
C. Discovery
Statements made by a defendant which are to be used at trial
should be disclosed to the defense pursuant to established rules of
discovery.5" In Cum bie v. State,53 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence testimony con-
cerning a defendant's statements. The existence of these statements
was not disclosed to the defendant prior to trial, and the court did
not conduct an inquiry to determine whether the defense was preju-
diced by the nondisclosure.54 Unless such an inquiry is conducted by
the trial court, no appellate court can be certain that errors of this
type are harmless.
46. It is not necessary for the state to prove a waiver of constitutional rights if it is shown
that the statements were made spontaneously. Sikes v. State, 313 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 2d Dist.),
case dismissed, 322 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1975).
47. State v. Dixon, 348 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977); Singleton v. State, 344 So. 2d
911 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977). But see Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1977) (although defend-
ant exercised his right to remain silent, he may later change his mind and voluntarily waive
this protection).
48. M.D.B. v. State, 311 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 321 So. 2d 555
(Fla. 1975).
49. Jarriel v. State, 317 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 845 (Fla.
1976), and cases cited therein.
50. Id.
51. 343 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1977).
52. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220.
53. 345 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam).
54. See generally Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
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D. Impeachment
Although incriminating statements made by a defendant are
inadmissible during the state's presentation of its case because of
the failure of custodial officers to give Miranda warnings, such
statements may be admissible to impeach the defendant's testi-
mony at trial. In Nowlin v. State," the Supreme Court of Florida
overruled its prior decision in Crawford v. State," and held that an
otherwise inadmissible confession may be used for impeachment if
the state has first shown that it was voluntarily made. This decision
follows the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Harris v. New York." The Supreme Court of Florida stated that it
was uncertain of the precise meaning of the Supreme Court's state-
ment that confessions made in violation of Miranda would be ad-
missible for impeachment if "the trustworthiness of the evidence
satisfies legal standards,"" but held that, at the very least, it meant
that the statements must be proven to have been voluntarily
made." This logic follows the long standing reasoning of our juris-
prudence which has held that involuntary confessions are inadmis-
sible not only because they violate a person's fifth amendment right
to remain silent but also because such confessions are presump-
tively unreliable.
IV. DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
Generally, the state has a privilege of nondisclosure of the
identity of confidential informants who have supplied the prosecu-
tion with information concerning a crime. However, if an inform-
ant's identity is relevant and helpful to the defense, disclosure is
required." This is true even when an informant is not called upon
to testify at trial or hearing but simply provides the police with
information which is helpful in their investigation.
In Munford v. State,"' the trial court denied a defense motion
to compel disclosure of an informant. The-District Court of Appeal,
Second District, reversed, stating that the informant appeared to be
more than a "mere tipster." He was, rather, the sole moving force
in arranging a buy of narcotics by the police. Therefore, the inform-
55. 346 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1977).
56. 70 Fla. 323, 70 So. 374 (1915).
57. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
58. Id. at 224. Since this article was written, the Supreme Court has clarified its position
on this issue. Mincey v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978).
59. 346 So. 2d at 1024.
60. State v. Hassberger, 350 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1977).
61. 343 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
1018 [Vol. 32:1007
CRIMINAL LAW
ant would be valuable and material to establish the defense of en-
trapment or to corroborate evidence of entrapment to which the
defendant may wish to testify. The court stated that the best proce-
dure to ensure that a defendant's right to a fair trial is not abro-
gated, while at the same time protecting the state's interest in non-
disclosure, is to hold an in camera hearing. At such a hearing the
trial court should question the informant to ascertain whether his
testimony might be helpful to the defendant. The prosecution
should also be questioned concerning the interests which the govern-
ment may have in resisting disclosure. In camera proceedings are
not required in all situations. However, where the defense has made
an initial showing that nondisclosure would hamper the defense, an
appellate court will not uphold nondisclosure unless there is suffi-
cient evidence in the record to the contrary. Even though the confi-
dential informant may not have been present and may not have
participated in the drug transaction for which the defendant was
charged, the disclosure of his identity may be necessary if the sale
is considered dependent upon a prior sale in which the informant
had been a participant.2
Occasionally, the state may wish to have a confidential inform-
ant testify as a witness in a criminal trial, while asserting the privi-
lege of nondisclosure as to the informant's name and present ad-
dress. In State v. Hassberger,"3 the Supreme Court of Florida an-
swered a certified question on this issue, holding that the name of
a confidential informant who testifies as a state witness at trial
cannot be withheld. The court expressed approval of the personal
safety exception to the otherwise ordinary duty of the state to allow
the defendant full access to its witnesses on cross-examination, but
noted that this exception is an exceedingly narrow one and that all
doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused's constitutional
right to confront witnesses against him. In Hassberger, a new trial
was granted because the trial judge had not required the confiden-
tial informant to appear before him in camera and testify to specific
threats which were made against his safety as a result of his testi-
mony in that case. If the state wishes to invoke the personal safety
exception, it must place sufficient evidence in the record for the
reviewing court to determine whether or not the alleged threats to
a witness' safety were such as to overcome the defendant's interest
in disclosure. The court recognized that, in general, it is prejudicial
to deny to a defendant the opportunity to place a state witness in
62. Richert v. State, 338 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976), cert. denied, 346 So. 2d 1250
(Fla. 1977).63. 350 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1977).
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his proper setting and to put the weight and credibility of his testi-
mony to a test."' The identity of a witness is not only an appropriate
preliminary step to the cross-examination of the witness, but it is
also an essential step in identifying the witness with his environ-
ment.
In accord with this reasoning is Crespo v. State,5 in which the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the trial court
erred in precluding the defendant from cross-examining a confiden-
tial informant regarding criminal charges then pending against the
informant. The court stated that a criminal defendant has a right
to cross-examine a prosecution witness as to any matter relevant to
the witness' bias or self interest. When a prosecution witness is
under criminal charges at the time he testifies, the defense is enti-
tled to elicit this fact. Even if a witness is charged with some other
offense, the defendant is entitled to show by cross-examination that
the witness' testimony is affected by fear or favor growing out of his
detention.
As noted by the Supreme Court of Florida in Hassberger,6 the
disclosure of confidential informants involves the balancing of the
defendant's need for full and complete cross-examination and the
safety of the witness. Once the defendant has made an initial show-
ing that the testimony of the confidential informant is relevant to
the preparation of his defense, the state has the burden of proving
why this evidence is unnecessary or why nondisclosure is essential.
In all situations where the disclosure of an informant's identity is
relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused, or essential to a
fair determination of the cause, the privilege must give way. In such
situations, if the government withholds the information the prose-
cution must be dismissed. 7
V. SPEEDY TRIAL
A. Custody
Under Florida's speedy trial rule, 8 the time period for the
commencement of trial begins to run when an accused is taken into
custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to
the crime with which he has been charged. Generally, a defendant
64. Id. at 3 (citing Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282
U.S. 687 (1931)).
65. 344 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
66. 350 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1977).
67. See generally Hatchett, Discovering the Identity of the Informer, 46 FLA. B.J. 644
(1972).
68. FLA. R. CalM. P. 3.191.
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is taken into custody for speedy trial purposes when he is arrested."9
If a suspect is not formally arrested, however, but is merely detained
by the police for questioning, the speedy trial time limit does not
commence.7" Where a summons, rather than an arrest warrant, has
been issued against an accused, the accused is taken into custody
within the meaning of the speedy trial rule the moment he is served
with the summons.7 Although the state has only ninety days from
the date a juvenile has been taken into custody until the delin-
quency proceedings must begin, a juvenile who has been certified
to be tried as an adult must be brought to trial within 180 days from
the time he is taken into custody.7" In State v. Bassham,73 the Su-
preme Court of Florida held that a detainer is not the equivalent of
an arrest for purposes of the speedy trial rule. Therefore, a detainer
placed by one county on a prisoner held by another county is not
considered custody within the contemplation of the speedy trial
rule.74
B. Calculating Time Limits
In calculating the speedy trial time limits, the date the accused
is taken into custody does not count.75 The last day of the speedy
trial time period is counted unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next
day.76 Legal holidays do not include those days which may be federal
69. See State v. Parnell, 221 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1969). In Deloach v. State, 338 So. 2d 1141
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1976), the defendant was taken to a hospital by the police. The officer advised
the defendant that he was under arrest so that a blood alcohol test could be administered.
Although he was released by the hospital and was never taken to jail, the court held that he
had been taken into custody.
70. Snead v. State, 346 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976). In State ex rel. Dean v. Booth,
349 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977), the court stated:
To construe the speedy trial rule to mean the time starts running every time the
police take a suspect to the station for questioning could have a deleterious effect
because the police might feel compelled to make an arrest on less than sufficient
evidence in order to activate the wheels of the prosecutorial process before the
time runs out.
71. Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1975).
72. State v. Benton, 337 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1976). The supreme court rejected the state's
argument that the speedy trial period should commence at the time the juvenile defendant
has been certified to be tried as an adult. Prosecutors may also wish to note that the supreme
court has held that, according to FLA. STAT. § 39.05(7) (1975), a delinquency petition which
is filed more than 30 days after a complaint is received in the intake office of the Division of
Youth Services must be dismissed with prejudice.
73. 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1977).
74. However, a demand for speedy trial may be made pursuant to FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.191(b) (2).
75. State ex rel. Williams v. Bruce, 327 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
76. Barlow v. State, 345 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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holidays, but not state holidays." If a defendant is otherwise contin-
uously available for trial, the state must bring him to trial for a
felony within 180 days. The mere swearing of a panel of jurors and
qualifying them to try cases does not amount to the bringing of a
defendant to trial.78
C. Availability
A defendant, applying for a discharge because of a violation of
the speedy trial rule, has the ultimate burden of showing that he was
continuously available for trial during that period. The state, how-
ever, in opposing the motion for discharge, has the initial burden of
making a prima facie showing of the defendant's unavailability. 7
Generally, the failure of a defendant or his counsel to appear at a
scheduled court proceeding is sufficient proof that the defendant
was not continuously available for trial.80
D. Waiver
A defendant may expressly waive his right to be brought to trial
within the speedy trial time period by seeking and obtaining a con-
tinuance."1 A defendant's attorney may also waive a defendant's
right to a speedy trial if he stipulates to a continuance.82 This is true
even when a defendant's attorney requests a continuance without
the knowledge and consent of the defendant. 83
It has been held that acceptance of a court date beyond the 180
day speedy trial limit, in open court, by the defendant's attorney
constitutes a valid waiver of the defendant's right to speedy trial.8"
Such a waiver, however, will not be presumed from a silent record.85
Mere silence on the part of the defendant or his counsel at a pro-
ceeding at which the defendant's trial date is set beyond the speedy
77. State v. Jones, 332 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
78. In State v. May, 332 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976), the jury panel was sworn and
examined as to their general qualifications to serve as jurors during the subsequent week.
Although that was the 180th day since the defendant had been taken into custody, no jurors
were called to serve in the defendant's case, no voir dire was made and no other action was
taken until two days later, when the defendant moved for discharge from the crime. The
district court held that it was error to deny this motion.
79. McMullen v. State, 331 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); Troy v. State, 341 So. 2d
223 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976); Richardson v. State, 340 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
80. State v. Exposito, 327 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
81. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(d)(2); Troy v. State, 341 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
82. State v. Kelley, 322 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
83. Brown v. State, 328 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
84. State v. Nelson, 320 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
85. Smith v. State, 345 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977); Flournory v. State, 322 So. 2d
652 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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trial period does not constitute a waiver."
In a multiple count prosecution, a valid waiver of the speedy
trial limits or a stipulation to a continuance by the defendant as to
one charge also constitutes a waiver as to other charges filed against
the defendant which arise out of the same transaction." However,
the defendant's filing of a bona fide demand for speedy trial revokes
his prior waiver and entitles him to a trial within sixty days. 8
Other actions by a defendant or his counsel may contain an
inherent waiver of the defendant's right to be brought to trial within
the speedy trial period. In State v. Hendricks,8 the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the defendant's exercise of his
statutory right to transfer his case from the municipal court to the
county court constituted a waiver of the speedy trial rule since it was
a trial tactic which resulted in him not being continuously available
for trial within the meaning of the speedy trial rule.
In Bell v. State,0 the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
held that the defendant's introduction of the defense of insanity,
with requisite mental examinations and sanity hearings, consti-
tuted a waiver of the speedy trial rule since the defendant was not
continuously available for trial. In State v. Embry," the Supreme
Court of Florida resolved a conflict among the district courts as to
whether or not the requirement that a defendant be continuously
available for trial was negated by the filing of pretrial motions
within the speedy trial time period. In Embry, the supreme court
rejected the trial court's finding that the defendant's prior demand
for speedy trial was spurious because he subsequently filed a motion
to suppress. However, since Rule 3.191(d)(2) of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that the speedy trial time limit may
be extended by order of the court for periods of reasonable and
necessary delay resulting from proceedings or hearings on pretrial
motions, the supreme court held that the trial court had properly
extended the speedy trial time limit to hold the hearing on the
defendant's pretrial motion. Thus, the defendant was not entitled
to discharge.
E. Extensions
A trial court has the discretion to grant a stay upon motion by
86. State v. Ansley, 349 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
87. State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
88. State v. Acurse, 347 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
89. 309 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
90. 318 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
91. 322 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1975).
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the state for delay caused by proceedings specifically listed in Rule
3.191(d)(2) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, or other
exceptional circumstances set forth in Rule 3.191(f) of the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The exceptional circumstances con-
templated by that section are not limited to those specifically enu-
merated but include any others involving matters of substantial
justice to the accused, the state or both." In addition, Rule 3.191(g)
provides for an automatic ninety day extension after receipt by the
trial court of a mandate from an appellate court granting a new trial
to the defendant. 3 In all other cases, extensions of time based upon
appeals taken by the state are governed by Rule 3.191(d)(2). It
should be noted that this rule was amended in 1977 specifically to
include an appeal by the state from an order dismissing a case.9
In State v. Williams,95 the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
Rule 3.191(d)(2) specifically contemplates the effect of an interlocu-
tory appeal on the speedy trial rule's time limits. A motion granted
under this provision stays the time under the speedy trial rule only
pending completion of the appellate proceedings. Upon receipt of a
mandate by the trial court which concludes the appellate proceed-
ings, the speedy trial time again begins to run. In Williams, the
state took an interlocutory appeal and the trial court entered a stay
after 135 of the 180 days available under the speedy trial rule had
elapsed. The court held that once the mandate of the appellate
court had been received, the state had only forty-five days left
within which to bring the defendant to trial. In State ex rel. Girard
92. State ex rel. Girard v. McNulty, 348 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1977).
93. FLA. R. CiM. P. 3.191(g) provides:
A person who is to be tried again shall be brought to trial within 90 days from
the date of declaration of a mistrial by the trial court, the date of an order by the
trial court granting a new trial, the date of an order by the trial court granting a
motion in arrest of judgment, or the date of receipt by the trial court of a mandate,
order, or notice of whatever form from an appellate or other reviewing court which
makes possible a new trial for the defendant, whichever is last in time.
94. Id. 3.191(d)(2) provides:
The periods of time established b'y this Rule for trial may at any time be
waived or. extended by order of the court (i) upon stipulation, signed in proper
person or by counsel, by the party against whom the stipulation is sought to be
enforced, provided the period of time sought to be extended has not expired at
the time of signing, or (ii) on the court's own motion or motion by either party in
exceptional circumstances as hereafter defined, or (iii) with good cause shown by
the accused upon waiver by him or on his behalf, or (iv) a period of reasonable
and necessary delay resulting from proceedings including but not limited to an
examination and hearing to determine the mental competency or physical ability
of the defendant to stand trial, for hearings on pretial motions, for interlocutory
appeals, for an appeal by the State from an order dismissing the case, and for trial
of other pending criminal charges against the accused. For the purposes of this
Rule, any other delay shall be unexcused (emphasis added).
95. 350 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1977).
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v. McNulty," the Supreme Court of Florida stated that although it
is necessary for the state to apply to the trial court for an order
extending the speedy trial limit, such an order will be valid even
when based upon an ex parte motion and hearing.
An apparent conflict exists among Florida's appellate courts as
to whether an interlocutory appeal by the state automatically con-
stitutes an extension of time without regard to the entry of an order
extending the time period. In State v. Cannon,9" the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, agreed with decisions of the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, 8 and held that an order by the trial
court is required to extend the speedy trial time during the pen-
dency of an interlocutory appeal by the state. In State v. Pearce,99
however, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that an
interlocutory appeal by the state automatically tolls the speedy trial
period pending disposition of that appeal. There is also dispute as
to whether a trial court is required to grant an extension under Rule
3.191(d) (2) when the state has shown one of the circumstances enu-
merated therein, or some other exceptional circumstances.
In State v. Glidewell,10° the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, held that the trial court erred in refusing to grant an order
tolling the speedy trial time limits pending the disposition of an
interlocutory appeal by the state. Until this confusion is resolved,
the better practice is for the state to apply for extensions in all
situations in which it is taking an interlocutory appeal.
VI. IMMUNITY
Immunity from prosecution is based entirely upon statutory
authorization.'"' Immunity statutes are mechanisms for securing a
witness' self-incriminating testimony to aid in the prosecution of
third parties. The Florida Statutes' 2 vest state prosecutors with
authority to confer immunity on witnesses when the prosecution, in
its discretion, believes that it would be in the public interest to allow
one accused of crime to go free in order to help secure the conviction
of another. The state attorney may subpoena witnesses to appear for
questioning either before the grand jury or before the state attorney
alone. 0 3 The exercise of the prosecutor's discretion as to whether or
96. 348 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1977).
97. 332 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
98. E.g., Mullin v. State, 307 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
99. 336 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
100. 311 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
101. Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1977).
102. FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1977).
103. Id. § 27.04.
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not to immunize a possible defendant in order to obtain necessary
information requires difficult judgments on close questions. Under
section 914.04 of the Florida Statutes, once a witness has been
granted immunity, any testimony he gives may never be used
against him in any criminal proceeding or investigation.'0 ' Further-
more, this statute provides for transactional immunity, which im-
munizes the witness from prosecution for "any transaction, matter,
or thing concerning which"'' 5 he testified pursuant to the sub-
poena.'10 Transactional immunity attaches whether or not the im-
munized witness was a suspect before the investigation began.' 7
However, since the purpose of the immunity statute is to provide
protection from prosecution at least coextensive with the protection
provided by the privilege against self-incrimination, immunity does
not operate when a witness is compelled to produce nontestimonial
evidence. 08
There is an unresolved conflict among the Florida district
courts of appeal as to whether immunity attaches automatically or
must be expressly granted when a witness gives testimony pursuant
to a state subpoena. In Orosz v. State,'°0 the District Court of Ap-
peal, First District, held that the immunity statute is not self-
operating. Although the witness in that case had been subpoenaed
by the state to testify concerning a crime and did in fact testify, he
was not immunized from prosecution because he failed to assert his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The court stated
that " 'compulsory attendance is one thing and compulsory testi-
mony is quite another.' "It0
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has taken a
similar approach. In State v. Newsome, "I the defendant voluntarily
appeared at the state attorney's office where she testified under
oath. She was subsequently subpoenaed to appear at the state attor-
ney's office a second time, and without being advised of her consti-
tutional rights, she was placed under oath and asked by the prosecu-
104. Id. § 914.04.
105. Id.
106. See State ex rel. Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1973).
107. State ex rel. Key v. Fogle, 347 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
108. Woodsmall v. State, 334 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
109. 334 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
110. Id. at 28 (citing the principle of law set forth in State ex rel. Foster v. Hall, 230 So.
2d 722, 723 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970)). See also State ex rel. Hemmings v. Coleman, 187 So. 793
(Fla. 1939), which stands for the proposition that a person's constitutional rights are not
violated if he is compelled to attend a grand jury investigatory proceeding and, after being
advised of his fifth amendment privilege, gives self-incriminating testimony without objec-
tion.
111. 349 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
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tion if she could explain certain inconsistencies in her prior testi-
mony. An information was later filed charging her with perjury by
contradictory statements. The trial court held that since the defen-
dant was not the focus of the investigation, no transactional immun-
ity was conferred upon her. The trial court, however, determined
that the witness was granted "use" immunity. The district court
disagreed that the witness was granted any immunity whatsoever:
In order for a witness' testimony to result in either transactional
or use immunity . . . the witness must be compelled to testify.
The fact that . . . [the witness] was subpoenaed to testify,
standing alone, does not mean that her testimony was compelled.
Since she did not object to giving testimony, and the record does
not reveal that she was coerced in any way, [her testimony was
not compelled and immunity did not attach]."'
The prosecution was under no obligation to apprise the witness of
her Miranda rights because she was not the target of any investiga-
tion. Similarly; in State v. Perkins,"' the court held that a defen-
dant could not claim transactional or use immunity on the grounds
that he had turned over documents to the state attorney in compli-
ance with a subpoena duces tecum when neither the defendant nor
his counsel objected on the grounds of self-incrimination during the
investigatory proceedings."'
The District Courts of Appeal for the Third and Fourth Dis-
tricts have taken a different approach. If a witness presents testimo-
nial evidence pursuant to a subpoena to appear before an investiga-
tory proceeding of the state attorney, that witness is automatically
granted transactional and use immunity unless the witness has
waived his immunity."5 In State v. Yatman,1"1 the defendant was
issued a subpoena commanding him to appear before the state at-
torney and to answer questions concerning various criminal charges
pending against him and others. Acting on the belief that his client
would be immunized from prosecution, the witness' attorney ad-
vised his client to appear and to testify. At the deposition, the state
attorney advised the defendant of his rights and asked him to sign
a waiver of immunity. The defendant complied with this request
and was subsequently charged with the commission of a crime. The
defendant moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that the
112. Id. at 772 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
113. 349 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
114. Accord, State v. Powell, 343 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977); Thomas v. State, 342
So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
115. State v. Deems, 334 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
116. 320 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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state had granted the defendant immunity by taking his deposition
in the absence of counsel. The trial court found that the defendant
had not intelligently waived immunity and granted the motion. The
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, remanded the case for
further proceedings on the issue of whether or not the waiver of
immunity was voluntary. It rejected the state's argument that the
proper remedy for an involuntary waiver of immunity is merely
suppression of the statements, rather than dismissal of the prosecu-
tion. The court emphasized that unless an intelligent waiver of
immunity is shown, the state, by issuing process requiring a defen-
dant to appear and give testimony, effectively immunizes that de-
fendant from prosecution."7
The Supreme Court of Florida has not resolved this conflict.
The court has, however, recently addressed a related issue which
provides some indication as to its attitude toward this subject. In
Tsavaris v. Scruggs, "I the defendant, Dr. Tsavaris, was being inves-
tigated for the murder of his girlfriend. The state attorney issued a
subpoena duces tecum to the doctor's secretary, ordering her to
produce various office files, including medical records and the doc-
tor's personal appointment book. The defense argued that the secre-
tary's compliance with the subpoena conferred immunity upon Tsa-
varis. The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that no
citizen can be immunized from prosecution by another citizen's
compliance with a subpoena. In addition, the court noted that Dr.
Tsavaris had been called as a witness before the grand jury, but
invoked his fifth amendment privilege. At that point the prosecu-
tion stopped all questioning, thereby electing not to confer immun-
ity from prosecution upon the witness.
Because of the present state of confusion in this area, the best
approach for state prosecutors would be to advise all witnesses ap-
pearing pursuant to a subpoena that they have the right to assert
the privilege against self-incrimination. This is particularly true in
those cases where a witness has been charged or is suspected of the
crimes under investigation. If the witness then refuses to testify, the
prosecutor can determine whether he wishes to confer immunity
from prosecution. If the witness is advised of his rights and voluntar-
ily answers questions, no immunity will attach.
117. The court stated that, "if the alleged waiver of immunity was involuntary, then the
state by issuing process to require [the defendant] to testify before the state attorney without
an intelligent waiver of immunity has effectively immunized the [defendant] from prosecu-
tion in accordance with the statute." Id. at 403.




Although a prosecutor has the power to compel the attendance
of a witness at any investigatory or court proceeding, he lacks inher-
ent power to compel testimony. At most, he can grant immunity
from prosecution, and if the witness continues his refusal to testify
the state may seek to invoke the powers of the court. The refusal of
a witness to testify pursuant to a court order or a grant of immunity
by the state may subject the witness to either civil or criminal
contempt.
In Pugliese v. Pugliese,"9 the Supreme Court of Florida dis-
cussed at length the distinctions between civil and criminal con-
tempt, direct and indirect criminal contempt, and the procedural
requirements for both.2 0 The court noted that certain conduct can
be the subject of either civil contempt (proceedings to coerce a
person to act in a certain way) or can be the basis for criminal
contempt (proceedings where the trial court determines the conduct
to be obstinate and seeks to vindicate the authority of the court by
punishing the contemnor). Although the nature of the conduct is not
determinative of the character of the order, a distinction must be
made since criminal contempt proceedings involve greater proce-
dural due process safeguards.' When civil contempt proceedings
are converted to criminal contempt, procedural due process of law
requires that the contemnor be given prior notice and a fair oppor-
tunity to prepare for the hearing on those charges.
In order to be held in contempt of court for refusal to comply
with a court order, such refusal must be willful. In Garo v. Garo, 2
the Supreme Court of Florida held that an order holding a party in
contempt for nonpayment of alimony was deficient because the trial
court made no specific finding that the party was presently able to
119. 347 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977).
120. For examples of direct and indirect criminal contempts, see Shelley v. District Ct.
App., 350 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1977); Jackson v. State, 345 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1977); Martinez v.
State, 339 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); Garber v. State, 335 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1976); Easley v. State, 334 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
121. FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.830 & 3.840. In Pugliese, certain statements by the trial court
indicated that the contempt sentence was intended to punish, rather than to coerce the
contemnor. In addition, the absence of any provision allowing the contemnor to purge himself
of the contempt, and thereby terminate the sentence, made it appear that the order was for
criminal contempt. The court, however, noted that the order was sought by the adverse party
to the litigation, which is the classic method for initiating civil contempt. Furthermore,
although the contemnor's counsel had received notice of a hearing for contempt, he had no
reason to believe at the time of the hearing that it was for other than civil contempt. The
contemnor was not notified that he was charged with a crime. If he had had such notice, he
might not have admitted his violations of the trial court's order.
122. 347 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1977).
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pay any amounts due, or that the contemnor previously had the
ability to comply but had divested himself of that ability through
fault or neglect designed to frustrate the intent and purpose of the
order. "'23 In Aiello v. State,"4 the defendant was held in contempt
and incarcerated for his refusal to respond to questions posed by the
state pursuant to a subpoena issued in the course of an investigation
regarding a pending criminal trial. The defendant was advised,
however, that he would be permitted to purge himself by testifying
at the subsequent trial. The defendant, who was still in custody
when the trial began, offered to testify on behalf of the state but was
not called as a witness. The appellate court held that the defendant
should have been discharged from custody because he had been
denied the opportunity to purge himself of contempt through no
fault of his own.
Generally, if a witness has been given immunity from prosecu-
tion, he cannot with impunity refuse to testify on grounds of self-
incrimination. In McDonald v. State, 5 the defendant was acquitted
of an alleged rape after testifying at trial on his own behalf. He was
subsequently called as a witness at the trial of a codefendant on the
same rape charges. He refused to testify about the circumstances of
the crime, asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. The
trial court advised the witness that his prior acquittal precluded the
state from trying him again on those charges. In addition, the prose-
cutor immunized McDonald. 2 The witness, however, continued his
refusal to answer. After each refusal, the trial court summarily
found him guilty of direct criminal contempt and thereafter sent-
enced him to fifteen consective terms of 178 days each. On appeal,
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the imposi-
tion of multiple contempt convictions but held that the trial court
was correct in advising the witness that since he was immune from
prosecution, he could not with impunity refuse to testify on the
grounds of self-incrimination. The court reasoned that if a witness
is granted full immunity in order to compel him to testify, that
protection is complete unless the witness perjures himself while
testifying. The immunized witness need not fear prosecution for
prior inconsistent or perjured statements.'27 The court noted that its
opinion was in apparent conflict with the decisions of the District
Courts of Appeal for the First and Third Districts in Saunders v.
123. See also Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976).
124. 338 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
125. 321 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
126. This immunity was granted pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1973).
127. 321 So. 2d at 455.
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State18 and Salem v. State, 2 respectively. In those cases, the courts
upheld the witnesses' refusals to testify, despite grants of immunity,
on the basis of a justified fear of self-incrimination. In both of those
cases, the witnesses had previously testified under oath and alleg-
edly feared prosecution for perjury by inconsistent statements.30
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in McDonald stated
that Salem and Saunders may have been correctly decided if based
upon the fact that the witnesses were given a limited, rather than a
complete offer of immunity from prosecution. The McDonald court,
however, emphasized that it would strongly disagree with the hold-
ings in those cases if full immunity had been granted and the courts
had upheld the refusals of the witnesses on the basis that there
allegedly existed a substantial risk of prosecution for perjury grow-
ing out of prior inconsistent testimony. 31
If a trial court wishes to impose a sentence of imprisonment in
excess of six months for a conviction of criminal contempt, it is
necessary for the court to empanel a jury to determine the question
of guilt or innocence. 32 If, as in McDonald, a witness improperly
refuses to answer a series of questions pertaining to the subject
matter of an investigation or trial, he commits only one contempt,
and multiple contempt penalties are unlawful.1 3
VIII. PLEAS OF GUILTY AND NOLO CONTENDERE
A. Acceptance of Pleas
In Williams v. State,' the Supreme Court of Florida resolved
a sharp conflict among the district courts as to whether it is reversi-
ble error for a trial court to accept a plea of guilty without inquiring,
on the record, into the factual basis for the plea. The court noted
that trial courts have a duty to determine: (1) that the circumstan-
ces surrounding a plea reflect a full understanding by the defendant
of the significance of his plea; (2) that the plea is made voluntarily;
and (3) that there is a factual basis for the plea. The court noted
that ninety percent of criminal felony cases are disposed of by guilty
pleas and that the acceptance of such pleas is one of the most
128. 319 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
129. 305 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
130. See Brown v. State, 334 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1976).
131. See State v. Newsome, 349 So. 2d 771, 772-74 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977) (Boardman, J.,
dissenting); Feldman v. State, 348 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
132. Aaron v. State, 345 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1977).
133. McDonald v. State, 321 So. 2d 453, 458 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976); accord, Baker v.
Eisenstadt, 456 F.2d 383 (1st Cir. 1972).
134. 316 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1975).
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important tasks of a trial judge. A proper and thorough inquiry by
the trial court at the time the plea is entered reduces unnecessary
appellate and post conviction review. The purpose of the factual
basis requirement is to ensure that the facts of the case fit the
offense for which the defendant is charged. Its primary purpose is
to avoid the possibility that a defendant will mistakenly enter a plea
of guilty to the wrong offense. In addition, a defendant must under-
stand the nature of the charge against him and the consequences of
his plea. The court in Williams, however, recognized that a plea is
not rendered involuntary because the defendant is influenced by
fear of a higher penalty in the event he is convicted at trial so long
as the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among
alternative courses of action open to him.'35 The supreme court
stated that trial courts have broad discretion in determining what
type of procedure to utilize in ascertaining the necessary factual
information. For example, the court may derive the factual basis for
the plea through statements and admissions made by the defen-
dant, his counsel and the prosecutor, or by other factual evidence
and testimony presented in the case. The supreme court held that
if the record reflects a voluntary and intelligent plea, the failure of
the trial judge to determine fully whether the defendant mistakenly
entered a plea to the wrong offense is no ground upon which to
vacate the plea absent a showing of prejudice or manifest injustice.
The principles set forth in Williams have been incorporated into
Rule 3.172 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 38
In State v. Lyles, 37 the trial court conducted an inquiry into the
factual basis of the defendant's plea, but during the colloquy be-
tween the court and the defendant, the defendant made factual
allegations implying a possible defense to the charges. Because the
trial judge failed to ask the defendant whether or not he had dis-
cussed this defense with his attorney and had been made aware that
by pleading guilty he was waiving this defense, the case was re-
manded with instructions to the trial court to: (1) make a proper
inquiry into the discussions between defendant and his counsel rela-
tive to any defenses that might be applicable; (2) receive further
evidence concerning the factual basis of the plea; and (3) allow the
defendant an opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf to
show how, if at all, any manifest injustice had occurred.' 31
135. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
136. The Florida Bar. Re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 343 So. 2d 1247, 1254 (Fla.
1977) (per curiam); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172.
137. 316 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1975).
138. Id. at 279. See also State v. Kendrick, 336 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1976); Andrews v. State,
343 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); Miles v. State, 338 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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If the facts asserted by a defendant set forth a defense which is
irrelevant to the charges to which the defendant pleads guilty, the
trial court need not make any inquiry to determine whether or not
the defendant has intelligently waived his right to assert this de-
fense."' However, the procedures set forth in Williams govern the
acceptance of all guilty pleas, including pleas entered as the result
of plea bargaining.'40
B. Nolo Contendere
Until 1977, there was no requirement that the trial court make
an inquiry into the factual basis of a plea of nolo contendere.1, In
1977, however, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted Rule 3.172(a)
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which makes such in-
quiry mandatory.' A plea of nolo contendere does not admit the
allegations of the charge in a technical sense, but states that the
defendant does not choose to contest the charges filed against him.
It is the equivalent of a guilty plea only insofar as it gives the court
the power to punish. Furthermore, a plea of nolo contendere is an
admission of guilt and waives all formal defects, as well as the
defendant's right to raise issues of fact on the questions of guilt or
innocence. In Vinson v. State, "I the supreme court held that if a
defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to the charges against
him, the court must either: "(1) accept the plea and enter a judg-
ment and sentence thereon; or (2) reject the plea, enter a plea of not
guilty for the defendant (after which the defendant would have a
choice of entering a plea of guilty or not guilty)"'4 and proceed to
trial. A trial court has no authority to enter a judgment of not guilty
based upon the facts set forth in the plea hearing.'
Generally, a defendant enters a plea of nolo contendere rather
than a plea of guilty for the purpose of reserving for appellate review
a question of law which the trial court has decided against the
defendant. In State v. Ashby, 4 the supreme court noted that plead-
139. Dardy v. State, 324 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
140. Grant v. State, 316 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1975).
141. Vinson v. State, 345 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1977).
142. The Florida Bar. Re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 343 So. 2d 1247, 1254 (Fla.
1977) (per curiam); FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.172(a).
143. 345 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1977).
144. Id. at 717.
145. In Vinson, the defendant was charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled sub-
stance. Pursuant to plea bargaining, he entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges. Over
the state's objection, the trial court proceeded to receive into evidence various exhibits and
to hear testimony. Subsequently, the trial court entered an order finding the defendant not
guilty of all charges.
146. 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
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ing nolo contendere and specifically reserving the right to appeal a
question of law is an acceptable practice. Generally, trial courts
should allow defendants to enter pleas of nolo contendere, reserving
their right to appeal any legal issue, rather than force defendants
to enter pleas of guilty."7 The holding in Ashby has been strictly
construed. If the record on appeal fails'to reflect that the appellant's
plea of nolo contendere was entered with a reservation of his right
to appeal a particular point of law, the appellate court will not
consider that issue. However, appellate courts have generally al-
lowed defendants to file supplemental records reflecting that the
plea of nolo contendere was in fact conditional on the reservation
of the right to appeal. 4 ' The supplemental record must show that
the entry of the plea was conditioned upon the reservation of a
defendant's right to appeal rather than his mere intention to appeal
subsequent to the entry of the plea. The recently amended Florida
Appellate Rules require not only an express reservation of the right
to appeal, but also the identification of the specific point of law
being reserved.' 9
The procedure of pleading nolo contendere with a specific reser-
vation of the right to appeal avoids the cost and delay of a full trial
when that would be futile. However, the decision of whether to
proceed by this method should be made with caution and only after
careful analysis of the individual case. For example, if one is plead-
ing nolo contendere, while specifically reserving the right to appeal
the constitutionality of a statute on its face, the defense should
realize that the appellate court will limit itself to a review of that
issue alone, and will refuse to address the issue of whether the stat-
ute can be constitutionally applied under the facts involved in that
particular case. Questions of fact are generally waived by a plea of
nolo contendere. 10 However, the sufficiency, on its face, of the
charging instrument is subject to review if properly preserved.'
The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically contem-
plate situations in which pleas of guilty or nolo contendere may be
147. Rece v. State, 333 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
148. Farrell v. State, 317 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975). See Beverly v. State, 322 So.
2d 597 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
149. FLA. App. R. 9.140(b) provides:
A defendant may not appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty; nor
may a defendant appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of nolo contendere
without an express reservation of the right to appeal from a prior order of the lower
tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being reserved.
150. Hand v. State, 334 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1976).




withdrawn.' 2 A plea may be withdrawn in the trial court's discre-
tion for good cause shown at any time prior to sentencing. If the plea
is shown to have been involuntary or if the defendant was incompe-
tent at the time he entered the plea, it is error for the trial court to
deny a defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 5 3 However, if a
defendant has pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargaining agree-
ment in which the state has promised to recommend a certain sent-
ence, the refusal of the trial judge to accept the state attorney's
recommendation is insufficient grounds to reverse a trial court's
order denying a motion by the defendant to withdraw his plea, so
long as the trial court informed the defendant prior to entry of the
plea that the court would not be bound by the state's recommenda-
tion as to the sentence."54 On the other hand, if the guilty plea was
induced by a commitment made by the trial judge and communi-
cated to the defendant or was based upon a failure of communica-
tion or misunderstanding of the facts, the plea may be withdrawn.'55
In Norris v. State,'56 the defendant alleged that prior to the
entry of her plea, she was not informed of the mandatory three year
minimum sentence required upon conviction of aggravated assault
involving a firearm. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hear-
ing to determine whether the defendant in fact failed to understand
the significance of her guilty plea to an offense involving the use of
a firearm. In Brown v. State, "I the appellate court reversed the trial
court's order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea prior
to sentencing. The district court stated that a full review of the
proceedings disclosed a general pattern on the part of the trial court
to pressure the defendant into entering a plea of guilty. The trial
court had allowed the state to amend an information on the morning
of trial to include a count charging an additional crime. The trial
court denied the defendant's request for a continuance. In addition,
the trial judge informed the defendant that he would impose the
maximum sentence of twenty years if the defendant went to trial,
whereas he would impose a five year sentence if the defendant would
plead guilty. On the basis of these facts, the district court held that
the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to allow the
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
Other Florida cases have held that if a trial court participates
152. Humphries v. State, 336 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.170(f).
153. Alleluio v. State, 338 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
154. State v. Adams, 342 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1977); FLA. R. CRM. P. 3.171(b)(1).
155. Surace v. State, 351 So. 2d 702 (FIa. 1977).
156. 343 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
157. 344 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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in plea bargaining arrangements and agrees that a certain sentence
will be awarded if the defendant cooperates with the plea bargain,
the trial court should not later give a higher sentence based upon
other factors if the defendant has fulfilled his part of the bargain.'"
If a trial judge believes that he should not comply with the bar-
gained sentencing arrangements, he is obliged to permit the defen-
dant to withdraw his plea. It is hoped that the recently amended
Florida Criminal Procedure Rules, governing plea discussions and
agreements and setting forth the various responsibilities of the pro-
secuting attorney, the defense attorney and the trial judge, will
prove helpful in assuring that pleas entered pursuant to such discus-
sions will be based upon a full understanding of the consequences.'59
IX. IMPROPER INQUIRY AND ARGUMENT
The Florida appellate courts have long attempted to delineate
what constitutes proper and improper argument by counsel during
trial. The courts seek to ensure that a criminal defendant is afforded
his constitutional right to present his defense to a jury at a fair and
impartial trial. In addition, while a representative of the state attor-
ney's office must vigorously perform his function as a prosecutor, it
is also his responsibility to ensure that the accused has a fair and
impartial trial.' However, numerous cases have continued to ap-
pear in the appellate courts in which the prosecution has exceeded
proper bounds, necessitating reversal and remand for new trial.'"
A. Character Evidence
It is a well established rule that the state cannot put an ac-
158. Pringle v. State, 341 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977); Williams v. State, 341 So. 2d
214 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); Moore v. State, 339 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976). See also FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.151(d).
159. FLA. R. CuM. P. 3.171-.172.
160. Rolle v. State, 268 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
161. As noted by Judge Downey in Harden v. State, 303 So. 2d 679, 680-81 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1974):
Many of the appeals in criminal cases today have only one troublesome point
on appeal, i.e., improper prosecutorial comment during argument and/or impro-
per inquiry into the defendant's past criminal record.
In this day and time we should be able to assume that trial counsel is familiar
with the limitations upon inquiry into a defendant's criminal record, particularly
those lawyers charged with the responsibility of prosecuting serious crimes.
Certainly nothing new has been stated here, but I would hope that merely
pointing up the problem might refresh the recollection of prosecutors regarding




cused's character into evidence unless and until the defendant
raises the issue of his good character, either by testimony of his
witnesses or by his own testimony. 6 ' The state's improper introduc-
tion of evidence relating to a defendant's bad character constitutes
reversible error whether such evidence was introduced as a trial
maneuver or whether its introduction resulted from inadvertence. "3
The fact that a defendant takes the witness stand and testifies in
his own behalf, admitting prior convictions, does not render the
error harmless.6 4 Furthermore, it is improper for a prosecutor to
cross-examine a defense witness concerning the alleged criminal
character of the defendant, unless the defendant has first chosen to
place his good character in issue."5
B. Prior Convictions
If a defendant testifies at his trial, his testimony may be im-
peached through inquiry by the state regarding any prior convic-
tions. If he admits such convictions, he may be asked how many
times he has been convicted, but if he denies the convictions, the
state must produce the record. In either event, the inquiry must stop
at this point. The matter may not be pursued to the point of naming
the crime.'
There is a conflict among the district courts as to the proper
manner of impeachment. In Irvin v. State,"7 the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that it was harmful error for a prose-
cutor to attempt to impeach a defendant's answer concerning his
prior crimes without producing and entering into evidence the re-
cord of prior convictions. In a footnote, the court stated that a rap
sheet would be insufficient documentation for this purpose, since
"[sluch a document is liable to inaccuracies and is not a certified
document."'' 8 In State v. Young,' however, the District Court of
Appeal, First District, stated that it was proper for the prosecution
to impeach a defendant's answer concerning the number of his prior
convictions by using a rap sheet to refresh his memory.
162. Andrews v. State, 172 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965); Jordan v. State, 107 Fla. 333,
144 So. 669 (1932).
163. Post v. State, 315 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
164. Id. at 232.
165. Roti v. State, 334 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
166. McArthur v. Cooke, 99 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1957); Jones v. State, 305 So. 2d 827 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1975).
167. 324 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
168. Id. at 686 n.2.
169. 283 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 290 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1974).
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In Fulton v. State, 70 the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
although a witness may be questioned about his prior convictions
for the purpose of testing his credibility, it is generally improper to
produce evidence of pending charges against a witness for impeach-
ment purposes. The court noted that the admission of such evidence
might unduly prejudice a jury against the witness; that an unproven
charge does not logically tend to affect a witness's credibility; and
that a person is presumed innocent until guilt is legally established.
There are exceptions to this general rule, for example, where the
pending charges arise out of the same episode which led to the
charges on which the defendant is being tried,'7 ' or where the exist-
ence of pending charges may be relevant to show the witness' motive
for assisting the state.'72 In Fulton, the state apparently offered the
evidence of pending charges in an effort to show the witness' bias
against the state. The court held that the supposed bias of a defense
witness, attributable to charges concerning a totally distinct of-
fense, is not a proper subject for impeachment. The probative value
of such inquiry is outweighed by the likelihood of prejudice to the
accused. In Fulton, this improper inquiry denied the defendant an
opportunity fairly to present his claim of self defense to the jury and
was thus reversible error.
C. Improper Comments
Generally, an appellate court will not consider allegedly impro-
per and prejudicial remarks made by a prosecutor unless the defense
objected to them at trial.'73 A timely objection to an improper com-
ment allows the trial court an opportunity to rebuke the prosecutor
for such impropriety and specifically to instruct the jury to disre-
gard such comments. Whether or not the comments necessitate the
granting of a mistrial is usually left to the sound discretion of the
trial court.'7
Considerable latitude is afforded trial counsel in arguments
concerning the merits of the case. Logical inferences from the evi-
dence are usually permissible. Also, otherwise improper arguments
made by a prosecutor will not be held reversible error if they are
invited by the argument of the defendant's attorney and do not
170. 335 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1976).
171. Herzig v. State, 213 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
172. Lee v. State, 318 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975); Morrell v. State, 297 So. 2d 579
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
173. Thomas v. State, 326 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1975); State v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515 (Fla.
1967).
174. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969).
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prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.' 5 In State v. Rucker,',
the prosecutor made an improper reference during closing argument
to the defendant's identification through the use of "mug shots."
The Supreme Court of Florida reiterated its prior holding in Loftin
v. State,'7 wherein it had held that a reference to the phrase "mug
shots" does not constitute reversible error in all cases, especially
when the trial court sustains an objection to the comment and gives
the jury cautionary instructions. If, however, such comments are
coupled with other improper references and thereby raise an imper-
missible inference as to the criminal character of the defendant,
they may have the cumulative effect of denying the defendant his
right to a fair trial.' 5
There are, however, several areas in which comments by a pros-
ecutor are particularly prejudicial and will generally result in the
reversal of a conviction. In Bennett v. State,'" the supreme court
held that any comment before a jury concerning a defendant's exer-
cise of his fifth amendment right to remain silent constitutes revers-
ible error without consideration of the harmless error doctrine.'80
Although silence in the face of an accusation does not always raise
a logical inference of the accused's guilt, the prejudicial effect of this
testimony outweighs any probative value.' 8'
Another category of highly improper comments concerns ex-
pressions by the prosecutor of his personal belief in the guilt of the
accused or the credibility of a key witness, when such expressions
imply that the state has additional information or knowledge which
has not been presented. In Thompson v. State'82 and Richardson v.
State, '3 the prosecutor improperly remarked during closing argu-
ment to the jury that the state could have produced several other
witnesses to support the case against the defendants.' 4 If an impro-
175. Allen v. State, 320 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
176. 330 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976).
177. 273 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973).
178. See generally Perkins v. State, 349 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977); State v. Wood-
son, 330 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
179. 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1975).
180. See also Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976).
181. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
182. 318 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1976).
183. 335 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
184. In Thompson, the jury's verdict hinged upon the weighing of the credibility of a
single state witness against that of a single defense witness, the defendant himself. The
prosecutor freely admitted during closing argument to the jury that the state's case was based
upon the jury's acceptance of a police officer's testimony concerning certain statements
allegedly made by the defendant at the scene of the crime. Instead of merely arguing why
the jury should believe the officer's testimony from the evidence presented at trial, the
prosecutor stated:
1978] 1039
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
per remark by the prosecutor is of such character that neither re-
buke nor retraction may entirely destroy its sinister influence, a new
trial may be granted regardless of the defendant's lack of objection.
A prosecutor should confine his closing argument to the evi-
dence in the record and should not make comments which cannot
be reasonably inferred therefrom. In a criminal trial, it is left to the
determination of the jury whether or not to believe a witness' testi-
mony. Prosecutors should not attempt to sway jurors by passion or
prejudice."'5 Likewise, it is well settled that it is reversible error for
a prosecutor to use the so-called "golden rule" argument (a tech-
nique of asking the jurors to place themselves in the position of the
victim).'"6 In Lucas v. State, 'I a prosecutor was describing the crime
of sexual battery during closing argument to the jury and queried
of the female jury members, "think how you ladies would feel if that
happened to you."' 6 This statement was held to be reversible error.
X. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Procedure
Criminal defendants must be given an opportunity to partici-
pate in the determination of the instructions and other information
that should be given to the jury. In Ivory v. State,'S the Supreme
Court of Florida held that a defendant in a criminal case is denied
a fair trial and due process of law when the trial judge responds to
a request from the jury, during the period of its deliberations, with-
out affording the prosecutor and the defendant or his counsel an
opportunity to be present and object to or request alternative
courses of action. In Ivory, the jury, after retiring to consider its
verdict, sent out requests for additional information and supple-
mental instructions. The trial judge responded to the jury's request
without notifying the defendant or his counsel. The supreme court
found this improper and held that any communication with the jury
outside the presence of the defendant or his counsel is so fraught
Now there were a lot of officers there; and I did tell you that I was going to
present five of them. This was a mistake on my part, because at the time I thought
I was going to, but there wasn't any need.
I said to myself, "Should I swamp them in quantity, or shall I give them one
good witness?" I just presented one witness who heard those statements.
318 So. 2d at 551.
185. Wilson v. State, 294 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1974); Grant v. State, 194 So. 2d 612 (Fla.
1967); Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959).
186. E.g., Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1966).
187. 335 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
188. Id. at 567.
189. 351 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1977).
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with potential prejudice that it cannot be considered harmless error.
It should be noted that, generally, trial counsel must object to the
giving of a particular instruction (or the refusal to give a particular
instruction) in order to preserve the point for appeal. The proper
procedure is to submit to the court a written request for jury instruc-
tions. 190 This rule, however, is not rigidly applied where the trial
court has previously indicated its refusal to give the requested infor-
mation."'
B. Lesser Included Offenses
In Brown v. State, "I the Supreme Court of Florida set forth the
substantive law relating to instruction on lesser included offenses.
The cases are divided into four general categories: (1) crimes divisi-
ble into degrees; (2) attempts to commit offenses; (3) offenses
necessarily included in the offense charged; and (4) offenses which
may or may not be included in the offense charged, depending on
the accusatory pleading and the evidence. In Brown, the court held
that an instruction must be given on all necessarily included offen-
ses, without regard to the evidence in the case.' In subsequent
cases, the court has held that such an instruction should be given
in spite of objection by the defense.' 9 '
The mandatory nature of this requirement was modified, how-
ever, in DeLaine v. State"5 and State v. Wilson.' In DeLaine, the
defendant was charged with rape. The lesser included offenses were
assault with intent to commit rape, assault and battery and bare
assault. The trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included
crime of assault with intent to commit rape, but refused to give an
instruction on the other lesser included crimes. The supreme court
observed that the jury could have convicted the defendant of that
lesser included offense included in the instructions, but did not do
so, choosing rather to convict on the greater charge of rape. The
court concluded that since the jury did not convict the defendant
of assault with intent to commit rape, the jury would not have
convicted him of assault and battery, which is "two steps removed"
from the crime of rape.9 7
190. FLA. APP. R. 6.7(g).
191. Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377, 384 (Fla. 1968).
192. Id.; Wilson v. State, 344 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
193. 206 So. 2d at 377.
194. Rayner v. State, 273 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1973); State v. Washington, 268 So. 2d 901
(Fla. 1972).
195. 262 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1972).
196. 276 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1973).
197. 262 So. 2d at 658.
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In State v. Terry,'8 the supreme court again attempted to clar-
ify its position as to the instruction on lesser included offenses.
There, the defendant had been charged with assault with intent to
commit murder in the first degree. The jury found the defendant
guilty of aggravated assault after considering testimony that she
shot the victim in self defense. The trial judge instructed the jury
on the offenses of assault with intent to commit murder in the first
degree, assault with intent to commit murder in the second degree,
assault with intent to commit manslaughter, aggravated battery
and aggravated assault, but refused to instruct the jury on assault
and battery and bare assault. The court found that the crime of bare
assault is necessarily included within the greater offense of assault
with intent to commit murder and thus falls within category three
of Brown. It was, therefore, prejudicial error for the trial court to
omit an instruction regarding this offense. The court further found
that assault and battery falls within category four of Brown, since
it is an offense which may or may not be included in the major
offense, depending on the accusatory pleading and the evidence.
The supreme court stated that in order to determine whether or not
it was necessary to instruct on assault and battery, the trial court
should have analyzed the charging information (the accusatory
pleading) and the evidence presented at trial (the proof).'"9 Since
the information and the evidence showed that the defendant had
not merely shot at the victim but had also injured him, the lesser
included offense of assault and battery should have been given.
In Lomax v. State,2 ® the Supreme Court of Florida noted the
conflicting decisions among the district courts and again attempted
to clarify its position. In Lomax, the defendant was charged with
robbery. Defense counsel requested instructions on attempted rob-
bery, assault with intent to commit murder, grand larceny and petit
larceny. Although the trial court gave instructions regarding rob-
bery, grand larceny and petit larceny, it refused to instruct the jury
regarding assault with intent to commit robbery and attempted
robbery. The district court had determined that this was error but
concluded that such error was harmless, since there was overwhelm-
ing evidence that the defendant committed the greater crime, and
the jury could not reasonably have found that only the lesser crime
was committed.*' The supreme court rejected the district court's
reasoning that the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense
198. 336 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1976).
199. Id. at 68 (citing Gilford v. State, 313 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1975)).
200. 345 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1977).
201. Lomax v. State, 322 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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should be held harmless if no reasonable jury could infer that the
crime charged was not in fact committed. That reasoning would
improperly allow a trial court to invade the province of the jury by
making a unilateral determination that a lesser included offense
instruction is unnecessary when there is overwhelming evidence to
convict the defendant of the crime charged. 02 The court noted that
Terry and other similar decisions are based on the concept of "jury
pardoning." This concept contemplates that a jury has the power,
and must be given the opportunity, to "pardon" a defendant for a
more serious offense by convicting him of a lesser one, even one
which does not exist as a matter of fact in the case. Thus, instruc-
tions on attempts to commit the greater offense charged should be
given, even though the evidence clearly shows that the major offense
was completed.0 3 However, it is not necessary for a trial court to
instruct on the attempt to commit a certain crime when, as a matter
of law, the attempt to commit that offense does not constitute a
crime in the State of Florida. °0
C. Homicide
It appears that the Supreme Court of Florida has made a dis-
tinction between those instructions necessary in homicide prosecu-
tions and those required in prosecutions for other offenses. In Martin
v. State, 015 the supreme court specifically held that in cases involv-
ing homicide, proper jury instructions are limited to those charges
involving lawful and unlawful homicide. In that case, the court held
that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct on
aggravated assault, even though that crime might technically qual-
ify as a category four lesser included offense under Brown v. State.2 01
The court rejected the argument that this holding might allow the
trial court to invade the province of the jury, because the jury's duty
in a homicide prosecution is to ascertain whether the defendant
caused the victim's death, and if so, whether the homicide was
justifiable or unjustifiable.
In Adams v. State, 207 the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the
"jury pardon" concept, at least as it pertains to the various degrees
of homicide under category one of Brown. In Adams, the defendant
202. 345 So. 2d at 721.
203. Id.
204. King v. State, 339 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1976). See Silvestri v. State, 332 So. 2d 351 (Fla.
4th Dist.), aff'd, 340 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1976).
205. 342 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1977).
206. 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968).
207. 341 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977).
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was convicted of first degree murder. The indictment and evidence
showed that the murder had been committed by the defendant dur-
ing the commission of a robbery. The supreme court noted that the
distinction between first and second degree felony murder depends
on whether or not the defendant was present at the scene of the
crime. 08 The court held that it was not error for the trial court to
instruct the jury that it was required to return a verdict of murder
in the first degree if it believed that the defendant had fatally
beaten the victim during the course of a robbery.
Similarly, in State v. Jefferson'" the defendant was charged
with first degree felony murder. The court instructed the jury re-
garding the offenses of first degree felony murder, first degree mur-
der, second degree murder, third degree murder, manslaughter, ex-
cusable homicide, nonexcusable homicide, aggravated assault and
several other lesser-included offenses. No instruction, however, was
requested or given on second degree felony murder. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the trial court's failure
to instruct on second degree felony murder constituted fundamental
error. 10 The supreme court disagreed and quashed the decision of
the appellate court.
D. Insanity
In Roberts v. State,"' the Supreme Court of Florida held that
the failure to instruct the jury in accordance with the defendant's
request, as to the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity, constituted reversible error. In doing so, the court ex-
pressly adopted the "Lyles Rule." ' The court rejected the State's
argument that by informing the jurors of the consequences of their
verdict, their attention would be drawn from their chief function as
triers of fact, and they would be led to compromise their verdicts.
To the contrary, the supreme court stated:
Freed from confusion and wonderment as to the possible practical
effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, jurors will
be able to weigh the evidence relating to the factual existence of
legal insanity in an atmosphere untroubled by the distracting.
thought that such a verdict would allow a dangerous psychopath
to roam at large.213
208. See State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
209. 347 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1977).
210. 334 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
211. 335 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1976).
212. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
213. 335 So. 2d at 289.
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The court noted that the consequences of a verdict of acquittal by
reason of insanity are set forth in the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure."' In Wheeler v. State,"' the court reaffirmed its holding
in Roberts but rejected the defendant's argument that the court
should abandon the M'Naughten Rule."' The court noted that it
had recently reapproved this rule by adopting jury instructions on
insanity which require a jury to determine whether a defendant was
incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the
alleged offense." 7
XI. SENTENCING
The prescribed punishment for a criminal offense is a matter
of substantive law.21 When imposing a sentence, a trial court must
comply with the relevant statutory requirements. In Benyard v.
Wainwright,21 the Supreme Court of Florida held that a statute,2 1"
governing the imposition of concurrent and consecutive terms of
imprisonment, controls over inconsistent criminal procedure
rules. 22' The court reasoned that since the determination as to
whether a sentence is consecutive or concurrent directly affects the
length of time spent in prison, substantive rather than procedural
rights are involved and these rights must be protected.
The statute governing credit for county jail time already served
has undergone a similar development. Prior to its amendment in
1973, the Florida Statutes"22 left the determination of whether credit
should be given for time spent in jail awaiting trial to the trial
court's discretion . 23 The statute, however, now provides that such
credit is mandatory.2 4 In cases decided since the amendment, this
section has been construed to require trial courts to give credit for
time served as a condition of probation, 225 and to give credit even
though the defendant was held in jail on other charges. 26 The
214. FLA. R. GUM. P. 3.460.
215. 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977).
216. Florida has adhered to the M'Naughten Rule since 1902. Anderson v. State, 276 So.
2d 17 (Fla. 1973).
217. 344 So. 2d at 246 n.2.
218. See State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969).
219. 322 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1975).
220. FLA. STAT. § 921.16 (1975).
221. FLA. R. CrIM. P. 3.722.
222. FLA. STAT. § 921.161 (1973) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 921.161 (1975)).
223. But see Adams v. Wainwright, 275 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1973).
224. FLA. STAT. § 921.161(1) (1977).
225. Ivey v. State, 327 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1976); DeLaughter v. State, 337 So. 2d 848 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1976).
226. Voulo v. Wainwright, 290 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1974).
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courts, however, have also held that a defendant is not entitled to
duplicate credits against several different sentences.227
Prior to July 1, 1974, the Florida Statutes22" specified that a
term of probation could not extend more than two years beyond the
maximum permissible sentence. This provision, however, was elimi-
nated by the legislature in 1974,229 and subsequently it has been held
that absent a specific legislative grant, a court cannot impose proba-
tion beyond the maximum permissible sentence for the crime of
which the defendant stands convicted." This same amendment
expanded the trial judge's specific statutory authority to use a "split
sentence probation alternative" for persons convicted of felonies as
well as misdemeanors."' Thus, it is proper for a trial court to pre-
scribe a period of county jail followed by probation, so long as the
cumulative time does not exceed the maximum permissible sent-
ence. Similarly, it is proper for a trial court to award probation and
impose, as a special condition, that the defendant serve a portion
of his probation in the county jail. 32
In accordance with the concept that the legislature, rather than
the judiciary, has the authority to prescribe sentences for crimes,
the supreme court has recently rejected several attacks on the con-
stitutionality of various maximum and minimum sentencing stat-
utes.233 These statutes neither constitute a usurpation of executive
or judicial power nor constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
However, the supreme court has held that a trial court, pursuant to
legislative authority, may consider the imposition of probation as an
alternative to a mandatory minimum sentence.2 34
A. Probation
The alternative of probation vests wide discretion in the trial
court to regulate the conduct of a criminal defendant without taking
227. Freeman v. State, 340 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); Dixon v. State, 339 So. 2d
688 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
228. FLA. STAT. § 948.04 (1973).
229. 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-112, § 10.
230. Magnin v. State, 334 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); Watts v. State, 328 So. 2d
223 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
However, FIA. STAT. § 948.04, as amended, does provide for probation up to six months,
which is in excess of the 60 day maximum sentence for a misdemeanor of the second degree.
231. McNulty v. State, 339 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
232. State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976).
233. Sowell v. State, 342 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1977); Banks v. State, 342 So. 2d 469 (Fla.
1976); Owens v. State, 316 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1975); Dorminey v. State, 314 So. 2d 134 (Fla.
1975).




the more drastic step of incarceration. Of course, as noted above, it
is proper to require a defendant to serve some time in county jail as
a condition of probation. 35 Thus, a trial court has the discretion of
giving a probationer a "taste" of the hardships of incarceration,
thereby providing a warning of possible consequences if further
criminal acts are committed. In addition to the routine conditions
of probation, such as those requiring a defendant to avoid criminal
acts and to file periodic reports during a probationary period, a trial
court may impose any other special condition of probation, so long
as it is not unreasonable or unrelated to the purposes of rehabilita-
tion. The purpose of probation is primarily to rehabilitate and not
to punish. 3 A condition of probation reasonably related to the
crime for which the offender has been convicted and directed toward
a reasonable restraint of activity in order to diminish the inclination
to commit similar crimes is proper and, therefore, not an abuse of
discretion. 3 For example, in Russell v. State,"8 the defendant had
been convicted of aggravated assault during a shooting incident in
a store known as "Dave's 95th Street Gunshop." As a special condi-
tion of probation, the trial court required the defendant to avoid
those premises. On appeal from the imposition of probation, the
appellate court held the condition valid. However, in Kominsky v.
State,239 the defendant was placed on probation pursuant to a con-
viction for possession of marijuana. Two of the special conditions
the trial court imposed restricted the defendant's driving to a maxi-
mum speed of thirty-five miles per hour and required the defendant
to observe an eight p.m. to six a.m. curfew. The District Court of
Appeal, First District, held that the curfew restriction was so harsh
that it would counteract the concept of rehabilitation, and amended
it to read eleven p.m. to six a.m. Furthermore, the court stated that
the maximum driving speed restriction was unreasonable since a
minimum speed of forty miles per hour is required on all interstate
highways.
Several recent decisions have noted the problems involved in
imposing a condition of probation which orders the payment of
money without regard to the probationer's rights to due process and
equal protection of the laws. In Fresneda v. State,20 the Supreme
Court of Florida held that the trial court had improperly required
235. State v. Askary, 330 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1976); State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976).
236. Kominsky v. State, 330 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
237. Russell v. State, 342 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
238. Id.
239. 330 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
240. 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1977).
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the defendant, who was convicted of leaving the scene of an acci-
dent, to pay more than $1,600 in restitution without an opportunity
to be fully heard as to the amount of damages. The court held that
a trial judge cannot impose a condition of probation requiring a
probationer to pay money to, and for the benefit of, the victim of
his crime in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct
caused the victim. Therefore, before ordering restitution as a condi-
tion of probation, the trial judge should give the defendant notice
of the proposed restitution order and allow the defendant an oppor-
tunity to be heard as to the amount of damage or loss "caused by
his offense."24'
In Crowder v. State,4 ' the district court held that the statutory
provision on restitution243 does not allow a court to require a defen-
dant, as a condition of probation, to make restitution in other unre-
lated cases for which the defendant has not been convicted. In
Crowder, the trial judge improperly required the defendant to make
restitution in twenty other cases, unrelated to the offense for which
he was convicted. The court, however, noted that this might not
prevent a trial court from including such conditions in a probation
order when the defendant, as part of a plea bargain, acknowledges
his responsibility for the other offenses and agrees to make restitu-
tion. It has also been held that it is unconstitutional to revoke a
defendant's probation for failure to make required payments pur-
suant to a special condition of probation, when there has been no
showing that the probationer is in fact able to make such pay-
ments. " In addition, the various debtor exemptions provided by the
Florida Constitution and statutes may place restraints on a trial
court's ability to collect money from a probationer by means of a
special condition of probation.
In State v. Williams,"5 the supreme court held that section
27.56 of the Florida Statutes (1975), which requires recoupment of
the cost of services received from the public defender by an indigent
defendant, is constitutional only if the judgment debtor is afforded
the protections which other debtors receive under state constitu-
tional or statutory exemptions. This principle of law may be applic-
able to those cases requiring a probationer to pay money under a
special condition of probation. As noted above, ' trial courts may
241. Id. at 1022; FLA. STAT. § 948.03(1)(g) (1977).
242. 334 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
243. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(1)(g) (1977).
244. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974); Gryca v. State, 315 So. 2d 221 (Fla. lst Dist.
1975); Robbins v. State, 318 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
245. 343 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1977).
246. See text accompanying notes 122-23, supra.
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find a person to be in contempt of court for failure to make pay-
ments of money under a court order only if the trial court makes a
finding that the defendant has the present ability to comply with
the order and willfully refuses to do so, or that the defendant pre-
viously had the ability to comply but divested himself of that ability
through his own fault or neglect designed to frustrate the intent and
purpose of the order. 47 No useful rehabilitative purpose exists for
revoking a defendant's probation absent a showing of willful disobe-
dience to the trial court's special condition of probation.
Probation revocation procedures must comply with minimal
due process requirements. Thus, a defendant's probation cannot be
revoked based upon a probation violation of which he has no notice
and with which he has not been specifically charged.248 Furthermore,
fundamental fairness requires that a defendant be put on notice as
to what he must do or must refrain from doing on probation. Proba-
tion should not be revoked absent such notice.24 A trial court, how-
ever, has the authority to impose additional valid conditions during
the probationary period.250 It has been held improper to revoke pro-
bation if the probationer has been denied discovery of the informa-
tion on which the revocation is based.' Although a much lower
standard of proof is required of the state in proving a violation of
probation, revocation cannot be based solely upon hearsay. 52 Fur-
thermore, probation cannot be revoked solely upon proof that a
probationer has been arrested for a crime. 53 The failure to introduce
sufficient proof of a violation at the time of revocation is not cured
by a defendant's subsequent conviction in the substantive case.254
However, the fact that a probationer may have been previously
acquitted of the substantive criminal charges does not, under the
principle of collateral estoppel or double jeopardy, prevent his pro-
bation from being revoked on the same facts which gave rise to those
charges. 55 It should be noted that generally it is improper to attack
a condition of probation in an appeal from a revocation of probation.
Rather, an improper condition of probation should be directly ap-
247. See Garo v. Garo, 347 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1977); Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650
(Fla. 1976).
248. State v. Spratling, 336 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1976).
249. Id.; Morgan v. State, 341 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
250. Barber v. State, 344 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977); FLA. STAT. § 948.03(2) (1977).
251. Sukert v. State, 325 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
252. Brown v. State, 338 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); White v. State, 301 So. 2d 464
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
253. Brown v. State, 338 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); Crum v. State, 286 So. 2d 268
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
254. Warr v. State, 330 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
255. Russ v. State, 313 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1975).
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pealed at the time it is imposed by the trial court."'0
A person placed upon probation should realize that his legal
status has changed considerably. In State v. Heath,257 the Supreme
Court of Florida held:
[A] probationer, upon a specific request and at periodic inter-
vals, may be required to identify himself and provide all neces-
sary information for his supervision including the place of his
residence and his employment. He may also be required to con-
firm or deny his location at a particular place at a particular
time, to explain his noncriminal conduct, and to permit the
search of his person and quarters by the supervisor. Failure to do
so may itself be grounds for revocation or [sic] probation. His
agreement to accept the terms of probation effectively waives his
fifth amendment privilege with regard to this information.
However, the court in Heath recognized that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is still applicable to a proba-
tioner to protect him from inquiry into specific conduct and into
circumstances concerning a separate criminal offense. In State v.
Mangam,258 the supreme court reiterated that when a probationer
refuses to discuss his compliance or noncompliance with the terms
of his probation concerning his residence, the trial judge may con-
sider this fact in a revocation hearing and properly infer from this
silence that the probationer failed to maintain his residence as re-
quired by the terms of his probation.
In Croteau v. State,"9 the supreme court stated that a person
does not absolutely forfeit the protections of the fourth amendment
merely by assuming the status of a probationer. That status, how-
ever, is a factor which may be taken into account in determining
whether a particular search was in fact reasonable. The court noted
that although illegally seized evidence is clearly inadmissible in a
criminal trial for a new and distinct criminal offense, such evidence
may be admissible in a probation revocation hearing.6 0
256. Welsh v. State, 326 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976); Brown v. State, 305 So. 2d 309
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
257. 343 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1977).
258. 343 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
259. 334 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1976).
260. In his concurring opinion in Croteau, however, Mr. Justice Hatchett noted that it
was unnecessary for the majority to reach this issue. Id. at 580-81 n.2. See also Bruno v. State,




B. Same Transaction Rule
The same transaction rule, as it applies in sentencing criminal
defendants, has generated tremendous confusion in both the trial
and appellate courts of Florida. The policies behind this doctrine
have their roots in the history of our common law."' Although there
have been many Florida decisions construing this principle, much
of the recent litigation was initiated by the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Florida in Cone v. State"2 and Foster v. State."' In Cone,
the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and use of a firearm
during the commission of the same robbery. The court noted that
the two crimes, charged in the same information, were merely facets
of the same criminal act. Therefore, the supreme court held that the
defendant's sentence as to the use of a firearm during the commis-
sion of the robbery must be vacated, since only one sentence, for the
higher offense, could be imposed.2"' In Foster, the defendant was
convicted of burglary and possession of burglary tools. The supreme
court held that the trial court had erred in imposing two sentences
(one for each offense) since the two crimes constituted facets of the
same criminal transaction.6 '
A conflict subsequently arose among the district courts of ap-
peal as to whether a trial court could impose separate sentences
upon a defendant convicted of the crimes of breaking and entering
with intent to commit grand larceny, and grand larceny. In Estevez
v. State,"' the supreme court resolved this conflict, holding that the
crimes of breaking and entering and grand larceny are separate
offenses, not facets of the same transaction, and that two separate
sentences may be imposed upon conviction of the two offenses." 7 In
Jenkins v. Wainwright,"'6 the supreme court further attempted to
clarify its position on this subject, holding that when a defendant
is convicted of possessing two different illegal drugs, the same trans-
action rule does not apply to prevent the trial court from imposing
two separate sentences for two separate possession counts.2" Even
though each crime arose from the same incident, the defendant was
properly convicted of both counts since the possession of each drug
261. A lengthy analysis of Florida's common law history in this area set forth by Chief
Judge Robert T. Mann, in Edmond v. State, 280 So. d 449, 450-54 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
262. 285 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973).
263. 286 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1973).
264. 285 So. 2d at 13.
265. 286 So. 2d at 551. See also Yost v. State, 243 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
266. 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1975).
267. Id. at 694-95 (citing Steele v. Mayo, 72 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1954)).
268. 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1975).
269. Id. at 479.
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constituted a separate violation of the law. Thus, multiple sentences
were proper. Noting the inconsistency between this decision and its
prior decision in Foster v. State,70 the court specifically receded
from that decision to the extent that it conflicted with Jenkins.
Recently, in State v. Heisterman,27' the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida quashed a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, which held that the defendant was improperly convicted and
sentenced for two separate offenses because the facts proved at trial
constituted only one criminal act. The facts showed that the defen-
dant stood outside an occupied dwelling with a gun in his hand
yelling threats to the people inside. The defendant then fired six
shots into the house. The state argued, and the supreme court
agreed, that an assault with intent to commit murder was com-
pleted when the defendant verbally threatened the occupants of the
house and pointed a gun in their direction, placing them in fear of
their lives.272 This crime was proven without evidence that any shots
were fired. The defendant's other conviction, on the charge of shoot-
ing a gun into an occupied dwelling, was based upon the additional
evidence that several shots were actually fired into the house. Ac-
cordingly, the supreme court found that the separate sentences im-
posed by the trial court were proper and remanded the case with
instructions to reinstate the judgment and sentence imposed by the
trial court.7
In spite of these attempts to clarify the present status of the
applicability of the same transaction rule, unresolved questions con-
tinue to create conflicts among the various appellate districts. In
Johnson v. State274 the District Court of Appeal; Third District,
found that the decision of the supreme court in Cone had been
overruled implicitly by the subsequent decisions of the supreme
court in Estevez and Jenkins. Other district courts of appeal, how-
ever, continue to follow the holding in Cone. 2
In 1976, the Florida legislature passed a statute which provides:
Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode,
commits an act or acts constituting a violation of two or more
criminal statutes, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall
be sentenced separately for each criminal offense, excluding
270. 286 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1973).
271. 343 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1977).
272. Id. at 1273.
273. Id.
274. 338 So. 2d 556, 557 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
275. Rusnak v. State, 336 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); Carter v. State, 330 So. 2d
508 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976); Robinson v. State, 323 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975); Farmer v.
State, 315 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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lesser included offenses committed during said criminal episode,
and the sentencing judge may order the sentence to be served
concurrently or consecutively."
Since the legislature has the primary authority to determine what
sentences are to be imposed for particular crimes, this statute may
resolve some of the conflicts which have arisen concerning the same
transaction rule. This section is consistent with Estevez and
Jenkins, but contrary to Cone. However, under this statute it ap-
pears improper for a trial court to impose sentences on each of
several counts arising out of the same criminal transaction when one
or more of those offenses are merely lesser included offenses of the
major offense for which the defendant has been convicted. For ex-
ample, in Taylor v. State77 the defendant was convicted of two
counts of robbery, two counts of using a firearm while committing
or attempting to commit a felony, one count of sexual battery, and
two counts of grand larceny. Although affirming the other sent-
ences, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that it was
error to impose sentences on the grand larceny convictions since
they were lesser included offenses of the robbery charges. Similarly,
Yost v. State"' may continue to be valid since, depending on the
facts of the case, the crime of possession of a controlled substance
is a lesser included offense of the crime of sale or delivery of that
same controlled substance." '
C. Death Penalty
Florida's capital sentencing procedures, as enacted by statute,
give specific and detailed guidance to juries and trial judges to assist
them in deciding whether to impose the death penalty or life impris-
onment. 28 ° One or more of the aggravating circumstances enumer-
ated in the statute must be found to exist before a death sentence
may be imposed."' However, additional circumstances not enumer-
ated in the statute may be introduced in mitigation. Where such
mitigating circumstances exist, the death sentence should be im-
posed only if the statutory aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances. 22 As noted in State v. Dixone23 this
276. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (1977).
277. 330 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
278. 243 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
279. See also Orange v. State, 334 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
280. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1977).
281. Id. Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 1977).
282. Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1002 (Fla. 1977); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(b) (1977).
See also Note, The Eighth Amendment, Rape, and Sexual Battery: A Study in Methods of
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weighing process requires more than a mere counting of "X" num-
ber of aggravating circumstances and "Y" number of mitigating
circumstances. Instead it requires a reasoned judgment, in light of
the totality of circumstances, as to which factual situations require
the imposition of death and which can be satisfied by life imprison-
ment.
Quite often trial courts have considered aggravating circum-
stances not authorized by the statute. In those cases where statutory
and nonstatutory aggravating circumstances were considered, but
where no mitigating circumstances were found to exist, the error was
considered harmless." 4 Where mitigating circumstances are pres-
ent, however, any consideration of a nonstatutory aggravating cir-
cumstance by the trial judge entitles a defendant to a sentence and
trial. 85 Similarly, trial judges may occasionally find the presence of
two statutory aggravating circumstances when only one aggravating
factor is actually supported by the evidence. In Gibson v. State,86
for example, the trial court found that the murder was committed
during the commission of a robbery and for the purpose of pecuniary
gain. The Supreme Court of Florida noted that in all robbery mur-
ders these two factors will be identical.28 This piling up of aggravat-
ing circumstances may improperly tip the scales of the weighing
process in favor of death and, in most cases, is therefore impermissi-
ble.18 However, where there are no mitigating circumstances, there
is no danger that an unauthorized aggravating factor has served to
overcome the mitigating circumstances in the weighing process, and
such error will be held harmless.289
It also has been held improper to find as an aggravating circum-
stance that the murder was committed in an extremely "heinous,
atrocious, and cruel manner," ' when the facts of the killing were
no more shocking than in the majority of murder cases.29' In
HaUiwell v. State,92 the victim's body had been mutilated and dis-
membered, but only after death had occurred. The actual killing,
the court held, was not committed in a heinous, atrocious and cruel
Judicial Review, 32 U. MiAmi L. REv. 690, 704-08 (1978).
283. 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973).
284. See, e.g., Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1976).
285. Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1977); see Miller v. State, 332 So. 2d 65 (Fla.
1976); Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976).
286. 351 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1977); see Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976).
287. 351 So. 2d at 952. See also Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976).
288. 351 So. 2d at 953; see Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1003 (Fla. 1977).
289. Gibson v. State, 351 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1977).
290. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1977).
291. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
292. 323 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1975).
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manner. Similarly, in Purdy v. State2 3 the supreme court held that
the trial court erred in finding that the crime was committed in a
heinous, atrocious and cruel manner, when there was no evidence
to distinguish that crime from any other violation of the same crimi-
nal statute.9 '
A problem arises when a trial court determines that the aggra-
vating circumstances in a case outweigh those in mitigation and
imposes a sentence of death notwithstanding the jury's determina-
tion that the defendant should receive life imprisonment. When
there is such disagreement between the jury and the judge, the
jury's recommendation should generally prevail."9 5 In Tedder v.
State, the Supreme Court of Florida stated: "A jury recommenda-
tion under our trifurdated death penalty statute should be given
great weight. In order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury
recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death
should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable per-
son could differ." 2" The supreme court has upheld a trial judge's
sentence of death in spite of the jury's recommendation of life only
when the court found the jury's recommendation unreasonable.01
It has also been held that a discrepancy in the sentencing of
codefendants equally culpable of a crime does not comply with the
concept of equal justice under the law.2" Courts are presented with
difficult situations when one codefendant has pleaded guilty to a
lesser offense and received a lesser sentence, and the other defen-
dant has gone to trial and received a sentence of death.299 In Messer
v. State, 300 the supreme court held that evidence as to a lesser sent-
ence received by a codefendant is admissible, and may be presented
to the jury in the sentencing phase of a capital case.
The concept of equal justice under the law applies to the impo-
sition of similar sentences for similar crimes. It is not reserved only
for those cases in which two or more codefendants are sentenced for
the same crime. The Supreme Court of the United States found that
the Florida death penalty statute adequately provides for such
equal justice by requiring the Supreme Court of Florida to review
293. 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1977).
294. Id. In Purdy, the defendant was convicted of committing an involuntary sexual
battery on a child under 11 years of age. See Note, supra note 282, at 704-08.
295. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
296. Id. at 910.
297. Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1977). But see Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d
831 (Fla. 1977) (the supreme court failed to find a compelling reason to uphold the trial court's
rejection of the life sentence recommended by the jury).
298. Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975).
299. See Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1977).
300. 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976).
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all death sentences for consistency."' Since it is a difficult task to
fit the various decisions in capital cases into a regular and predicta-
ble pattern,"' appellate counsel in all death penalty cases have a
great responsibility, wherever possible, to present the court with
comparisons of sentences imposed in similar circumstances.
301. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); see Note, supra note 282, at 701 n.47.
302. See Spenkelink v. State, 350 So. 2d 85, 87-88 (Fla. 1977) (Hatchett, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 960 (1978).
